Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e435e460c21ac727…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.2 KB
MD5: c45efe7060ffc0b34333ecd99549473b SHA-1: 1eebd4437bed897ee9829f0944c8bfdb02198597 SHA-256: e435e460c21ac727c03916ceb13621d6b879fcfa07d162b620cf1673e73bd7c3
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, triggering critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and RTF_OBJDATA further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. This exploit is commonly used as a delivery mechanism for further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001faa.bin
3f95094c07e20df04cf14c77bc213d383548b17cc203e52dd730a2b16647cad9		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FAA 1715 bytes

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