Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e423db73644b177a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

33.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-24
MD5: 762dbe123e50a572a712d62bed017360 SHA-1: b26b0ee27a29531bc6868a10bbb8a2bc13b1b93f SHA-256: e423db73644b177ac6bbe3445932e8d23ed5835b058af257277d73bf0ef9080f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Service Execution

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) via embedded OLE object data. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document also contains text prompting the user to enable editing or macros, a common social engineering tactic. The primary goal appears to be exploiting the Equation Editor to achieve code execution, likely for downloading and running a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004088.bin
a2a664be9abbe2552dd35204d49fac9eb73bb90c52f0a69d0b1c27b824b96fe4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4088 1280 bytes