Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e41115eab331715e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

56.8 KB Created: 2020-08-03 20:32:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6e9da6828373d57e4dd17d18546d874a SHA-1: b04b938fcc6cbd34256831c6a6fb0aa1abeeb093 SHA-256: e41115eab331715e81cec23b811c494370e17fd175eda8a1ad82d5ecee81d5ec
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The heuristic firings indicate this is a PDF link farm, likely for SEO manipulation or to host further malicious content. The presence of numerous external links, including one to a URL associated with a malicious redirector, suggests a campaign to distribute malware or phish users.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=all+airlines+code+pdf
    • http://jirakako.allthingsgrammar.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695663/bizimobinosid.pdf
    • http://files.moombaparkps.vic.edu.au/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383514/4040691.pdf
    • http://files.musicatmainstreet.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739839/davetuxu.pdf
    • http://files.greenhaughfirstschool.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437376/tiwixij.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6571/2535/files/how_to_make_a_fake_virus.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/5911/6182/files/20321047228.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/2620/3302/files/91243763652.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0118/3397/files/navitiro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4842/6910/files/mozemowaxerifidafu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7936/7845/files/vorol.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6707/0877/files/nujuribitanaxubagozod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6143/5813/files/surezoxuvod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9391/6837/files/67717536383.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6530/3455/files/wemazironurazumase.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9145/2314/files/96196841448.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000a0d5.bin
e1cbbc71b3becb0751e1dd985a96f2838c3c56c2a064142fff428d081755fd58
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA0D5 5140 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000b261.bin
58ec6cae80d6ddbabbcbb787af2634c5f32985eb836776824fd2ee0f495a0ce9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB261 10652 bytes