Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · e40dd03a54ffd446

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

181.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-06-22

MD5: 99c07a6407017d2af7d0fb7dbdb741fb SHA-1: 97540c684aa049e2687f7a382fae0bfd785080ed SHA-256: e40dd03a54ffd44651199ff50dd90e9c955a22d301ac61dd69d4578da8d2e204

106 Risk Score

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL https://instaba.se/id3tvQ?&https://codecanyon.net/item/mitalk-p2p-webrtc-realedcloud-video-conferences/38376661 In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
SHA-256: `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000c00.pdf`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xC00	182784 bytes
SHA-256: `0e9381dc0e129445a464c2fe31cc7a9ff1cc0bffd98a40cf8f19a6c2cbc9aef7`

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