Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e40a101bef19c208…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: 87bd5574fed4e8faad6a5aaa3a2943e5 SHA-1: 0e29d51f35c3dacf9977af5f1612baa527d023f8 SHA-256: e40a101bef19c2082719c5274b164f1742c7c01bd00ed757d85d46113c156881
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering a critical heuristic for CVE-2017-11882 related to Microsoft Equation Editor. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability for client-side code execution. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE activation. Given the nature of the exploit, it is highly likely to have been delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B 4147 bytes
SHA-256: cf4a05d5118c279604afd0e4b9d4d6431c5bf4ee0675d99ce4f38a91321e932f