PDF malware analysis — malicious · e40704fe3d6ce236

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.2 KB

MD5: 4ea29f0f565ebb6ffbaaac1034e4afea SHA-1: 1516aeda821a543868d996a83c5cafd0ff22d276 SHA-256: e40704fe3d6ce236d948013b5a906709c736a1c63288939c9300a0318937fc16

104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PDF document that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. The heuristic firings indicate an embedded script payload and an embedded file, suggesting the document is designed to deliver and execute malicious code. The embedded URL is likely part of the exploit chain or a command and control channel.

Heuristics 6

Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188

PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xD2A	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xDDC	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0111.bin` `11aca504f157a0218a2bdc25d97739df7336c9b055ada6abc6c14b688017dd9e`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 111 at offset 0xFF6	57522 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x1F92	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x203F	77 bytes

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