Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e406c368b5812a8b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.92 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f77e56a9f06a7c9d5cf21a0a7ecb15dd SHA-1: 6aca6659b9198d2543e8e3ba388616424b782ac1 SHA-256: e406c368b5812a8b8b3ca89cf7104bd246bef81e20284a33a19dfa4714f317ec
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, which involves MSXML SAX OLE activation. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE strongly suggests that the document is designed to trigger this vulnerability. The embedded OLE object, specifically related to Equation Editor, is a common vector for this exploit. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact post-exploitation activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001e3d7b.bin
cbe136a4156f83d32e2b7e0eacb96fdbe08ac92dd0458e25e1d947599e234f97		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E3D7B 3739 bytes

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