Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3f76b676b7e7a73…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.9 KB Created: 2021-05-30 20:57:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: d078be060397a2e25600c1a563f0a73d SHA-1: 926079d9d66ea6fcc8fddb7eae255c702fe03e87 SHA-256: e3f76b676b7e7a73006b62a9f7a10835eef1540eaf497854b99bf4c0921013bb
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, and exhibits characteristics of a link farm. It contains numerous external URIs, with one pointing to a suspicious domain ('golowaki.ru') that is likely part of a phishing or scam operation. The PDF structure suggests it's designed to redirect users to a large number of other documents, potentially for SEO manipulation or to host malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://golowaki.ru/strik?utm_term=short+reading+passages+for+grade+10 PDF link annotation
    • https://wegenagozej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135394478/jowepasetalefod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mixunolonuwoja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969204/ximovawu-tizusasix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kutinimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134608846/watep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418984/normal_602304f625077.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vagajexaxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359414/tibirijezimumenajef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ketezujozak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134744557/fexakejowi-zixixowomadika-migusiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sajejedazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999783/9a38b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mepuviduvudutew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134383325/5323102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://molawaxurot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134699933/lugokivaziluzafew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duduzigofusu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815892/zopejawo-dilebap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417527/normal_600dec97c339d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374185/normal_602be6202c2dd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vebajixumese.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134483039/62b91.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://betisifi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438474/filana_voxetixobevuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robavefozaxun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134379548/45e8ba6f269d1b3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suxokigivulumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479742/5917858.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4483097/normal_5fc9be7f4eafb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ab0fd48-1385-4d8b-98aa-8d2cbdbd06b1/hampton_bay_ceiling_fan_and_light_remote_control_838-956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4a89fd7-e74b-466e-8d36-e1a7c71be82a/how_to_set_ubee_modem_to_bridge_mode.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d7ba3237-750b-4617-8eba-fdb50e2be9f9/hack_pubg_mobile_lite_0.20.0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/30918a13-0c7f-4e74-9bc3-4cec22577655/navewoguxutesagixonose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ebd960e6-dc5a-4b3e-9681-0e660d149591/here_i_am_lord_send_me_kjv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3cd4c6e5-ae40-4a25-9519-27b86a2fef5d/que_sucede_con_los_talleres_artesanales.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee5e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE5E 5568 bytes
SHA-256: d8eda872a2dcc2336f3f5093402daac15e7d052be9d50296fc16ec1ad34e34c3
font_01_sfnt_off0001014d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1014D 10736 bytes
SHA-256: add8861a1536f7d2fc276b77714f020a3961dee8829e1527a5ee48264594c3cc