Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3f4759a9209b467…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.6 KB Created: 2021-01-26 15:01:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 3074530886d06d241b09a7be6936cb09 SHA-1: 1864eb15c6ea09a601bceb32de95f88ac9aec74e SHA-256: e3f4759a9209b46741be042047177012539061d9127fe2f059ae7875c196ce02
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or redirection scheme. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'worksheet answers', aligning with a lure to entice users to click the embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/123?utm_term=ripple+tank+gizmo+worksheet+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://jakilirimilibev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134862861/04696c1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tesiligozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407846/pevinoxitemeri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lefatelaxebaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135398996/9019992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pisodanijuke.iblogger.org/73781423715.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://libufuvebugun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406816/5131653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wofovado.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871653/3312539.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pugajuxo.iblogger.org/rakawabokokumeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lujadexezusunam.22web.org/pofepabakitise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jagunafine.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363358/c0f2c5ba388c3de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rodupokikoxozed.22web.org/dujiwipigajejetawazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zubikuzo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453486/6886811.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gonufefimexej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134892828/9595635.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wisemidotoveto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349295/juzuzefusow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://dikawixum.epizy.com/money_laundering_reporting_officer_luxembourg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wuguwusilabibax.epizy.com/30149669044.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nekaxikafixof.epizy.com/71439177835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b0bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB0BD 5444 bytes
SHA-256: eddba00df0d05ba741c9e484f149defaa8a9e3688b2f0a8cda56e80a87357f2f
font_01_sfnt_off0000c335.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC335 10000 bytes
SHA-256: 83ca485af0fe370fc19f8dcabc1a921f50eaf3692a1b7fdca5f687bd05fff83c

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