Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3e45c7dbb904941…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.5 KB Created: 2020-12-22 19:28:27 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 757793e02d8d903f3f213f7247cbbcd1 SHA-1: dfcba044f2c894ec0be68ec545279e518fc1903a SHA-256: e3e45c7dbb90494192b5620d6a4a750a1eaaef8ddec6f4032955becefebe9e85
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or phishing attempt. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and ClamAV detected it as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous external links suggests the document's primary purpose is to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for credential harvesting or further malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/strik?utm_term=final+heroes+best+team+2020
    • https://kaperimivegorew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371305/b22e2d7b5d2c600.pdf
    • https://joweralifaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134350132/judoro.pdf
    • https://nenojidadexodu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134351563/nuratogusen-gitowebuke-xodejavabegulof-zakilebuwixili.pdf
    • https://vewusijonaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489037/vixerunaxo.pdf
    • https://lavazelowima.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316744/8268072.pdf
    • https://rijevolokawuja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661742/duwixofaxojoja_kaxurigore.pdf
    • https://nebelifufenav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437331/6535801.pdf
    • https://tivakoxidedopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776298/3cb8d4213231.pdf
    • https://kolokizegilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134370221/rakexitezosurobe.pdf
    • https://fagozeku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506452/nilawomelefuza.pdf
    • https://fudukonuxevefez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134606022/e1f63a389c62e.pdf
    • https://xelegiri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134435730/c517413d.pdf
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/xudinesixuxog.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c901.bin
ca3991e0fb82ce999c853910d14eb6c99d2c0d08a8b7a579408970ba966e5b99		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC901 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dacf.bin
30ca3799f6c50af0d06d6cb59ae395cc70e64bd769230833187c09121a8b1130		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDACF 10336 bytes

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