Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3e3fbfd7c1f7f33…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

145.4 KB Created: 2022-07-01 07:40:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-04
MD5: 737013041c383b02ec072cb1f7bc4137 SHA-1: 743fa3a1e9e1bd112e8cf0e75c9bba5a55be3723 SHA-256: e3e3fbfd7c1f7f33b3236f90b04ecca44be563500161901455956dc3806afafc
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is a Word document containing an embedded OLE object (ooxml_oleobject_00.bin) that drops a .jar file via an Ole10Native package. The high-entropy carved artifact (ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin) suggests the payload is encrypted or packed. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the heuristic firing OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE specifically identifies the payload as a jar extension.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
3ba1c74f36727a3802b0628b68d658e5e7e6d58cbf91b23795c76981f2ad90b8		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 120320 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
50cfaad1877b7568db39057aa7ec43377dbda0089dfa1338417b2a36666c0b29		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 116646 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
5bc8138525d9fa3917b843b69f66929dced196279567df3742b0428ae3cf8f15		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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