Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3e26095723f8dea…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.7 KB
MD5: 5abdce2089a852428f786b2e7f88d621 SHA-1: 3d0f443c9a25ac428bf8bbb7ac71df0d5a4abac1 SHA-256: e3e26095723f8dea90e5bf728d89411efca27718007406e52f0113237e7fd54c
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening, likely leading to the exploitation of a known Equation Editor flaw. This suggests a malicious document designed to deliver a payload via an exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b85.bin
bd2b995d914f88a680e2e21255085ff04352b379ea64612d9db55971f288db39
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B85 1961 bytes