Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3dca49b9ad55ed0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.71 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-12-10
MD5: fa95c55de35d22471d4d53264692222f SHA-1: e549a0d60bb8fc1a20c62504e707335ed75499a8 SHA-256: e3dca49b9ad55ed0ea718f0fe10fb64c4dc4de48a77e549eeb5d84ff97d0fac5
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882 indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability within the Equation Editor OLE object. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code. While no specific script was found to be executable, the presence of the Equation Editor exploit strongly suggests the file's purpose is to leverage this vulnerability for initial execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
0e8ec0c9cc1e55922d2921539f4721bcc1db3c037b0d3262c3bc4861d43e42a0
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0048D7D0/OLe10NAtIVE 1548 bytes