MALICIOUS
124
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
The sample is an OLE2Link file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 to load a remote URL. It also contains an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings, including encryption and image-only lures, suggesting it may be a secondary stage or part of a multi-stage attack. The embedded URL is the primary indicator of a remote loading mechanism.
Heuristics 5
-
OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
-
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
-
Encrypted PDF (string and stream contents are opaque to static scan) info PDF_ENCRYPTEDPDF declares /Encrypt — string objects and stream contents are encrypted with the standard security handler (RC4 or AES). On its own this is informational; legitimate encrypted documents include signed contracts, billing statements, and rights-managed material. Static heuristics cannot inspect encrypted payload bytes.
-
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://www.extensis.com/meta/FontSense/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
polyglot_child_pdf_off000aa800.pdfafa2eea64530b9981774af4d1df8b082939f29e035c2bc69eda5571f6e4f1453 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xAA800 | 892928 bytes |
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.