Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3d37397e7191006…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

34.6 KB First seen: 2023-05-24
MD5: 0ac08a867e4f5049f0485a80aae001cf SHA-1: 4b8c3db3b216914d6df72ab6a4bf650bcc420fb1 SHA-256: e3d37397e7191006598d4b0c1f1b252ae97dd88770c10d26e9e8859eed09bac5
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The presence of these elements strongly suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability and likely download a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000479a.bin
ee542978009defd3f42e37813786e4a6e19d0b1520f51d57d08712a7a7f36623
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x479A 1554 bytes