Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3c8cdf674db4413…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: dfe56b111424502f837fd7048ab4fe6d SHA-1: 305001839463b7938c15473fbf4dff9061787d15 SHA-256: e3c8cdf674db4413d36657125157e8001ba3c74975c4d7fdf58e37042533c689
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including one specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. Heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, which is triggered by the ".\objupdate" directive forcing OLE object activation. This suggests the file is designed to deliver a payload by exploiting this known vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
bdc60af73994ded9662d15aa9542427b9ab341032bc1bac936b1fda16985d84e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27140 bytes
objdata_01_off0001c9c9.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C9C9 475057 bytes