Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3b03d6c376e3174…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.28 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 185b488dfaba7dfe7d3198c997f7a00f SHA-1: e91de54b194a2fad9b7f0978470072d8058c2021 SHA-256: e3b03d6c376e317401a5ddc5d99caf74017ac9597c50bca80b1f98e8b6654aaa
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is activated by \objupdate, exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This indicates a malicious document designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The specific exploit and OLE object embedding point to a downloader or dropper functionality, though the exact payload and family are not identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0023e9ae.bin
36347e0f3574b463bfa89b78e34d670c73cb5d150014fd5133686afbe0c35c00
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23E9AE 3732 bytes