Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e38db248169f6a8d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.9 KB
MD5: ee88ff22b8c2385b52aee2b1ed956104 SHA-1: e4db65bc60ce7d5eddd453415d339fc16baba416 SHA-256: e38db248169f6a8d4ee9855d5e40a715d012c900ee6d19dc54cb05dce1f661f9
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, including OLE object data and specific Equation Editor-related heuristics. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. No specific malware family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000dc.bin
d2c2680019a6a9c95c76ce83dcf64dfb331ed14485a7c0884b47e77ad44a2987
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDC 2220 bytes