RTF malware analysis — malicious · e380843331044e85

MALICIOUS

RTF

77.7 KB First seen: 2024-06-21

MD5: b380556670eaff97d6dfb34144e8cbc5 SHA-1: 27b2289e4e1c8c599562a88d8991b8fac4208a70 SHA-256: e380843331044e854db0734b2685b54da83b0a99ff201ba0a9b90c5bb0e527b8

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000019a7.bin` `d91e16b46a061f863a59935c28df9e6bfd672fe2d2a7530b868ace9ce9af6966`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x19A7	1719 bytes

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