Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e364d207e5ed6285…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

38.6 KB First seen: 2023-02-20
MD5: e032205bb3bd7666287f956ba7b12f7c SHA-1: 45f1140d7bfd914cc85eff64bdd247d7e727cf7b SHA-256: e364d207e5ed628566265ea2ed094709af93c2fb47e2fe4bb3ee130fe020882a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security settings and execute malicious code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004414.bin
596479944796f9ede4d8724e34fc7dfa08797eb70dd2801fb0bd060c276618cf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4414 1618 bytes