Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e35755fa0180d56b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.7 KB Created: 2021-01-22 10:47:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: 8de2cf93c5146f078dccb727e1b7b166 SHA-1: ec99a0bebfbc9b785f2f219379d8e3f3cd1053c0 SHA-256: e35755fa0180d56b0f5a6b983fd814a9f3aca541a3c644b9946d4058f1a7c9b5
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a 'download' lure and the ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly indicate a phishing or malware distribution attempt. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of malicious intent, likely involving the exploitation of PDF vulnerabilities or social engineering to download further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/123?utm_term=mp3+music+search+download+apk PDF link annotation
    • https://jujipepovoduvu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017188/5855346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4488329/normal_5fe3a7fda5661.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tixaradizu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134652762/xoxavemukemo_vasizibama_juzesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1173660.mozfiles.com/files/1173660/27964858675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fimirexuf/Uhihdhg/33024959995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiteginizi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871518/pewopibirulavixowez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuwoveforu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134099073/dujokugofugevomav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dejutuzalusabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134869317/9413082.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/venujotiwufo/YWlAgy5/62794708270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vukezozonobobex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383599/kedipebutefokimipat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1178668.mozfiles.com/files/1178668/4235962414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zumegopepotiko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398003/kakediwifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bd84.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBD84 5640 bytes
SHA-256: 3e3434c558a00fd36c2454db1fe6edefa2f3631f15669a438fe6046b24a8c46e
font_01_sfnt_off0000d0a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD0A4 9848 bytes
SHA-256: 3f074c74c5e287022b14126be5de739d8e491173e3e3d9e1e4d29ccb4905d40a