Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e33bbe44c75320bf…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.5 KB
MD5: cc0423b41e2d01241497ee87d9db1d38 SHA-1: 1af324972f53a5a805daecc6ecf29645f65143bc SHA-256: e33bbe44c75320bf14d4fc7a3aafbf2241d516f6fc8faf939ab4742fe4e662c2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. The primary attack pattern is likely the exploitation of the Equation Editor to download and execute a secondary payload, though the specific payload could not be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001c3e.bin
6c5ed3bcb3fe5307e12cbcf4eba917a8fcc54f7f4f774820cfce50d916f16fa6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C3E 1967 bytes