RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · e338a82f086b5ab3

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

368.4 KB

MD5: 30e4197115461aa885357e4878f70fab SHA-1: 83b2a99860eed93260361949ca4ad6f55ff042b1 SHA-256: e338a82f086b5ab3388c33134f23b619b286acfdc3c33591b6936131b58f3654

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of OLE object manipulation, specifically ".objdata", ".objemb", ".objautlink", and ".objupdate". The presence of ".objupdate" strongly suggests an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882 or similar). The "SE_ENABLE_LURE" heuristic indicates the document likely prompts the user to enable content, a common delivery mechanism for macro-based malware or exploits.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `687c18b8867cfc470e6b1cce84088882929eaff60f5dda076115f9ac352f7244`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	76400 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `01cb477edbb0ce0fabc29ff6bb7817b6becc4638f94e8ff82c2e7529fbedcfa7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	76373 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002de3d.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2DE3D	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off0002f3e0.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F3E0	12297 bytes

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