Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3334aea81d2fa90…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.4 KB Created: 2020-12-24 21:10:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 235bb16c8ccceee73e923a3f8602d38a SHA-1: 69b535347f86665de91f3ca394fdd504305c321a SHA-256: e3334aea81d2fa9093331c50d0c2d2a8957a1e3144111ae12050096a3bc8e988
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO spamming operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing sites or download further malware. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with malicious PDF lures.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafftec.ru/aws?utm_term=crowding+out+effect+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://dowezepuxaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134463959/6056996.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dakagugi/igRggEu/pesara_pappu_curry_tayari_vidhanam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/waximanodif/f1jjqgj/51428196548.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resodarapasak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134659305/4601361.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavabakonoliwif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134477423/9128876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nujodobenume.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134441993/c80b8f1a8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xalipifizipig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379045/rakuruganuferu_fenekuwataj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xubuvene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380433/taguxiveboru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://setumimirakav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681532/kepubafujin-jotelip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tuwagezo/SpJjf4E/fimopavusuwaturadubat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/589705bb-4068-439c-aaaa-b09eae83c12f/40510347758.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c371ba61-ee2e-412a-979e-736747313ee5/47308928365.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e292.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE292 4900 bytes
SHA-256: 545676d3678939d921458066843a4fd9056e63fad61864f66eabd4c39badefce
font_01_sfnt_off0000f36a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF36A 11804 bytes
SHA-256: 354b15a2512f19393752af45eff27cd92fb1761f9eb666bfbfe772a8bf0fc4da
font_02_sfnt_off00011b1a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11B1A 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378

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