Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e31f5bfd01e6d587…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

340.8 KB
MD5: 285d05dd2a3a053e5095f09b609fca64 SHA-1: 668f3a6f6fa038bdbcd0e57d32783f37c259469d SHA-256: e31f5bfd01e6d5876991d6aae68921b7510090d880d2602ed57032e7d14a9cae
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked objects that are forced to update. This technique is commonly used to bypass macro security features and execute embedded malicious content. The presence of OLE object data and automatic linking heuristics strongly suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary payload. No scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload's specific actions.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
43099ea7c2ab1c66ba83fcb58a26e428d4d0bbbb4f0e86380000a15512c84b99
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 75537 bytes
objdata_01_off00026fc2.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x26FC2 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00028565.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28565 12297 bytes