Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e3154ff9ac79e1d6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.12 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 75c1d5cfab4c8aea8c3b266b45f9a535 SHA-1: d5e84a0543aa61f25893db13b5accc38419a8886 SHA-256: e3154ff9ac79e1d660352445e469da406829f6f17153e30f12128e6f9cfb145a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 Malicious Link T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to achieve code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly supports this attack pattern. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not provided, but the exploit is clear from the heuristics.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00114014.bin
a6b57097c1e233aa87703f3e279deda4d9c38609da2d5a3ac7f918ab821f3698		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x114014 3732 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.