Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e30cb92d1c3a4533…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.6 KB Created: 2020-11-07 22:04:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: d1ef583f8aaa59791b1796cecfe2696b SHA-1: 4beb3b222f7d2394674c121a4dd3f03152fe015d SHA-256: e30cb92d1c3a453384a4803e7451b41e6a1aaf4eb4f1b5014b21e3167f340ec2
156 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?keyword=wnep+weather+valerie+smock PDF link annotation
    • https://pozosukezogi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134386022/juzalimipana_rilanaxip_bifugubopu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xelabuxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235382/50c6b65365e472f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/4779879.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cbf3eb35-dd15-4fae-b8d8-8e021d20c018/vikokivonakiwuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2171211b-9618-48fc-b1f5-d5941d7e2ffe/pasepaposajasu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a9e7a45e-8ac6-4b1e-ac00-0480602d2be2/gunawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nujosuwemedadi/ozark_trail_screen_house_13x9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/naramuro/10110538497.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wipotegadodorek/pokemon_unblocked_games_77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/piwupevivotixi/dazopexa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bevekizadoxuj/lemirebufamabotaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fizup/hungry_shark_world_hack.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dixaleko/sezekexizaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/resixexi/79173689874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dadupawo/ectomorph_diet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rupatojuko/47102144469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ac8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6AC8 5400 bytes
SHA-256: 724c5448e0b39056eef3019ed4a7db41623ab79c3d257ac7e6e964fb3475f026
font_01_sfnt_off00007d0e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D0E 1852 bytes
SHA-256: 5ae1d259d034084be61ec780dd0ff4f7394a348651cf58c8458f9478dd568280
font_02_sfnt_off000085fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x85FE 10992 bytes
SHA-256: d25dfa6e3aa6d01b9edcd168df10e1c3d365576988f3160007cd35876b980098

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