Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e307adc61200c97d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.4 KB Created: 2021-06-07 01:52:35 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 2202c22df505d86086b4488d7db21740 SHA-1: a0222cd5cdc1225a79e092066f1905762ea5f389 SHA-256: e307adc61200c97d44f38da2afae19866b4b80e134cd7d26743ad173d1973188
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF document is designed to lure users into downloading a malicious payload through a network of embedded links. The heuristics indicate a link farm strategy, with multiple URLs pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, likely for SEO manipulation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, classifying it as a phishing trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
    PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=cell+division+answer+key+gizmo+pdf+-+slideblast.com In PDF document text
    • https://www.mii.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4f09bb97c2714f6ebc144f48953053ae/nazuroniku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://infravoip.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3226fb47023f758ef55393464b820d43/burefavivawovu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asfalon.com/__files/file/kazovidowuvogidekaludod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ahha.az/userfiles/file/pupapumageluratogilijizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://finsura-lifedirect.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081495b5af2d---jewutikalefikibom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://weddingdiy.cc/uploadfiles/files/20210603_104628_8776.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bodwellassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4881f28fcbb53584386e85f9231e45ba/62629722197.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hontoys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/gv5vmpbf31gerj9ebfg82ciabv/jurovew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://canadiancontractorservices.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1gd15pb9fb5ukjbi74l1m9jlp0/puliji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.letspassdriving.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lrbstjn38iotiiau6kk5raoesm/41655822664.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.aportecnica.com/imagenes/editor/file/54215193817.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.reachcast.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bf8697cecd3c8cb1e5427d001c9ff1a5/36156221287.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizdrive.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/16075c412620e6---nipiwuvib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cananalimdar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r5tlsaq9t2stvk3hum2i9t36jj/gobutatiwajavekagisal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://a2designbg.com/userfiles/file/21046517008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f498.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF498 5952 bytes
SHA-256: dff7a3d42e3bf158d6f024d630afb9037fd943cfa9142d86ec2978b2c08f2d12
font_01_sfnt_off000108f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108F7 10264 bytes
SHA-256: ed883428be26ed2636d95acbaeb9147ef83f4077e9e39413eddd36c6856510ec

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