Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e30138cf8a6cc0b7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

11.3 KB
MD5: 52c4d75be4ecfd2c876c1bb215dafae4 SHA-1: 4ddee27fdb617b54822b9fd238d8e2cc74533438 SHA-256: e30138cf8a6cc0b701a0e5bec908a74d2a40b47ac3a1ff40418c095d946e30b9
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, indicated by the RTF_OBJDATA heuristic. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office applications. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual clues about its intent. Without further script analysis or network indicators, the exact payload and delivery mechanism remain unclear, but the primary attack vector appears to be exploiting an Office vulnerability to trigger the execution of embedded malicious content.

Heuristics 2

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a81.bin
fc885486b3f4e3fe6783263c12ac0cc331bc6bbaf334b06c669995650cdf9f8c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A81 1516 bytes