RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · e300aab09b2ed2a6

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: 7fd0cd3e07322613afd2b62346d29961 SHA-1: cc2c32b915b9554505b95ec776643f99d9548b8e SHA-256: e300aab09b2ed2a6fe46ca16a00b5e87bb022f95ec40c05748ef34ec3505c15b

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object-related heuristics, including automatically linked objects and object updates, indicating it's designed to exploit OLE vulnerabilities. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', which is a common lure for macro-based malware. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure strongly suggests a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `434dd37aa4cfac30c199608bfd3f622ea00d367ad73a0b2d57584c83b4bfb7f5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79784 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `e5ecfa08a8f6a6b0ee2a8f3102039d885902eed38fa17ad7204f0bcbe82119a7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79757 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E	12297 bytes

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