Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2fdc318758c24a6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.7 KB Created: 2021-03-14 11:43:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 25318ad32421e332f9a67323172b909a SHA-1: 7429d2551c654e4f625dfd8f518314112569627c SHA-256: e2fdc318758c24a6c7e1a1a56fb10ee20b877583e4d8fa558b38e77b282b9df8
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which are likely part of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or redirect users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests a common tactic of encrypting payloads to bypass initial security checks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://zajinet.ru/123?utm_term=cisco+ipsec+vpn+client+android
    • http://igcopyrightclient.com/49709275036729vx.pdf
    • http://lg-copyrightforms.com/15617171395lz0gj.pdf
    • https://ronunute.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070227/b00dae61d720.pdf
    • http://smallita.space/official_myers_briggs_test_freejybs4.pdf
    • https://jazebaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134662006/maxunaru_dareb.pdf
    • https://buxexemap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134890763/bebev.pdf
    • https://sivikowililip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599649/e5d836dfce274a.pdf
    • http://kidiwutimako.mygamesonline.org/esc_hypertension_guidelines_2020.pdf
    • https://riwewupurudo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381540/vaputidaw-polonu.pdf
    • http://flowerport.store/non_collusive_oligopoly_models_pptihf3y.pdf
    • http://elerctum.org/changing_states_of_matter_worksheet_grade_1b2otc.pdf
    • https://tobivuzulukimu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384599/98d86f.pdf
    • http://zanovekolasin.mywebcommunity.org/beach_fishing_rigs_uk.pdf
    • https://jibudodenip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134364722/xoselosalatew.pdf
    • http://shtampshop.ru/todetanaruxapisa9um05.pdf
    • https://jisuxewaxem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857679/30c8a9.pdf
    • https://fofapabijutoza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713913/461406.pdf
    • http://wersita.space/circunferncia_da_cintura_e_risco_cardiovascularj7dzs.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://wutejaxevewef.myartsonline.com/killing_joke_eighties_nirvana.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ed67.bin
1f06cb201fff39ce258287f9e186964fe277a63253d2a19d540a185d26f3057c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED67 5032 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe93.bin
53634478bf1f603912b1fe9d24b0ff2c78f5c37dc3801d983c62bf1b13096335
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE93 12384 bytes