Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2e259fb0b16c64d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.5 KB Created: 2021-09-16 14:33:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 2709cd6c31224eaa5953db3acca379c9 SHA-1: f4c7c94764a4eaa799c64baf8e112f152fe4cbc7 SHA-256: e2e259fb0b16c64d57cdd3e288e5012e2ab154bdddf7bbf939b8165d1ece7050
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which are hosted on disposable domains or compromised CMS uploads, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The heuristic 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' also points to suspicious command execution patterns within the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pistant.ru/uplcv?utm_term=hiby+music+apk PDF link annotation
    • http://foxgraphics.paulsfashion.in/files/poretineketewigeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaufdeinauto.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16142cb7a2849c---vorixekepixevoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://krupongs.com/images/file/telofu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vizcsap.hu/files/file/nizuvojenigutefotovazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pilatesyoga.hr/files/files/bunugukuxero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sogelec-eng.com/files/ckfinder/files/65405505628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reklama-kemerovo.ru/files/files/90319794407.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://health-bridge.in/upload/file/40448297065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://normel.org/files/upload/file/11643070964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ahknchem.com/upload/files/takuretifiripuri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://montaze.org/democms/userfiles/file/selovefiwuxaxurudojofito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://charteriraq.ir/basefile/charteriraqir/files/64181000191.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://brillimet.com/uploads/files/202109130207122037.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://leonardscopysystems.com/home/leonards/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lesuwatezubosekor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dijladentalcenter-qa.com/userfiles/file/53589413347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stroi-sistema.ru/img/83538205916.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dfwsedan.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/74532043633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/94606607102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://isotope3.pm-ural.com/uploads/files/38164377366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://henanshuangxin.com/d/files/47547387463.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.driftime.ee/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136c589459bf---91601760042.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.finanzanlagen-honorarberatung.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613e86d9d4eb4---pabewezegizepuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://readxyz.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0cc50cc8148e2e718b0ba05aeb0f2dbc/88653747786.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keralatemples.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nanasuzobowogeporivip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://isotope3.pm-uralIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e081.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE081 10372 bytes
SHA-256: 740c2462409a962c6ce021ba48d4c9ef0119c8b9b2fc17eba2f336f6a4457dde
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7B9 18644 bytes
SHA-256: 1a16fb19de7af210b09997f1f2f0126eba819bd721d59c5dc6be309d01676bd7
font_02_sfnt_off0001288a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1288A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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