Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2cf44dd01188f73…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.1 KB
MD5: 2943d04f4b80be581aa1b7237525064d SHA-1: d3d274b9f7d1136db2321587b78bba4a753884d1 SHA-256: e2cf44dd01188f730071bea89526dd1f720c861ce052103787489ae6c67a7716
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000105a.bin
6e5b8d352c9aa30e09789bc0ef0bb586b89d5e6c1635668e05c86c9395a62263		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x105A 1873 bytes

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