Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2c1ded48db1e7e6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

58.3 KB Created: 2001-04-16 18:40:12 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: 03e0d0f5ead5ef430fd995c82295660f SHA-1: e4f9edc40acbf8d2ad4f346842ff9a8a3b3c2ed4 SHA-256: e2c1ded48db1e7e6f0dd4d08bef1f29c70861e818755c426c02e0718dc3ffdc9
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

This XLSM file contains a Workbook_Open macro that leverages VBA to execute PowerShell commands. The script also uses GetObject and cmd.exe references, indicating an attempt to launch external processes. The presence of the 'macros.bas' and 'vbaProject_00.bin' artifacts further confirms the macro-based nature of this malicious document. The primary intent appears to be downloading and executing a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2009/9/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2009/9/ac
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2014/revision
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2015/revision2
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2016/revision3

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4f1808e166c16458d86a1860a34bd78624eab4f46f749dce45569dd5ea1124e3
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 38389 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
d6d56a0c8c55405d2cd7a747f35d9e6d40f30395fcda7c51af4f7f2d8de7fd8e
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 14336 bytes