Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2b89ab149832658…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.5 KB Created: 2020-10-13 07:41:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: f8a5d6186855c9e1dabdc3e17dac80cd SHA-1: 980709dab7b1a0f7b0952d29e9f5d2d516e74b90 SHA-256: e2b89ab149832658dc4ab26692312c3d9e5343259ddecce2d850666850686406
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=drei+schritte+zu+dir+buch+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.gaiasgardencove.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968934/9056f1555c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ecoflodesign.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874368/c1ebef823b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xares.mcaprint.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408502/denisul-pobeluvewap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043829.mozfiles.com/files/1043829/xegavoxafuzoderegebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036991.mozfiles.com/files/1036991/wulalunireme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043564.mozfiles.com/files/1043564/notajir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036991.mozfiles.com/files/1036991/gawunum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037282.mozfiles.com/files/1037282/96929602821.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.aquestforhealthandpeace.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452794/26cd6b0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.becomingjewish.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453054/45c16b21d732c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.johnflemingcreative.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070027/bagixuxun-bexaxubanat-fasunenulu-kojew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fadan.projectnohunger.org/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164250/2213426.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ventuspublishing.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406947/6913333.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/5547/9464/files/17736229062.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9825/1165/files/timek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/2203/0760/files/midejevepibonefuvuzegimul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/2409/5653/files/chie_persona_4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/2907/5880/files/spring_salamander_for_sale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007b39.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B39 4856 bytes
SHA-256: 06730628b63ccb429feab96a0426320b177cc672ede1000d291fb29b1a16d8b9
font_01_sfnt_off00008bd6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8BD6 11288 bytes
SHA-256: 89c9c6aa07af469484463eccc6523e56186cbba2997f97dc96485f818dd5c781
font_02_sfnt_off0000b11f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB11F 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.