Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2927074c551bb18…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.78 MB First seen: 2021-06-30
MD5: b697bcbb31268d4b2a9121ffa394d1b8 SHA-1: de04c4dcdeb05b23d20aa9cb80f4ceef72323a8d SHA-256: e2927074c551bb188b4c33bed9addc70c25dd3bb9a0f702874a6ae44039a3532
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specifically the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic firing, which points to the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of shellcode command strings in the extracted artifact further supports this conclusion.

Heuristics 6

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 53954 bytes
SHA-256: 5ae74f0d63363706b9af41fa1da44944f0d686e2c87b06322ab0df849d26eb5b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName
objdata_01_off0002fdb7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FDB7 454791 bytes
SHA-256: abd132bf3ab8190dfb030bcb879a36061e9aef78c1060b63bd0588b35c7d316c