Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2507a586e3f1b59…

MALICIOUS

RTF

61.8 KB
MD5: 9cbfa24f2fe28cb7bdd96b7e1f9103fe SHA-1: 8f9149fd3fda3406143982722edaac176342f14c SHA-256: e2507a586e3f1b59d696755e600ea9d3b6f3b4c2d54d9518fabb854544075b66
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE objects and triggering heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates exploitation for client execution, likely delivered via spearphishing. The embedded OLE object and objupdate heuristic suggest the document attempts to activate the exploit, leading to payload execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b37.bin
afa681445be29266927ebfa6cab716e93e7e67a512f788d9e71b0363ccccf20a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B37 2038 bytes