Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e24f888bfb35c41c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB
MD5: 3ffbed6d4000690f71821c193cd94d38 SHA-1: a487f191fb5b4a0ea26904187c0a5380aaa74552 SHA-256: e24f888bfb35c41c6a419b96708dc191dae06db6f12f4ac09ecc6f581fcba39e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to enable macros or content, a common tactic for malware droppers. No scripts were extracted, and the primary indicators point to a lure-based delivery mechanism for an embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
39c4cab8bf2c1408aee6566b83eeb3c79cab2e0d4a2431e051d839de0c3d7498
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171550 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e29.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E29 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593cc.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593CC 12297 bytes