Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e22e26c10b2961d9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

143.1 KB Authoring application: Msftedit 5.41.21.2512 First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: ef450b2d8d8c19b3e8b67c1c56f2a685 SHA-1: a7744dfbebd97c4aee3ca55f2ed5c3ad206daecb SHA-256: e22e26c10b2961d9f5edea7fdc39925a20f96873b1b2ec14bae1f2833f1dbe0a
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and PE headers, strongly suggesting it is designed to exploit vulnerabilities and execute a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data and an embedded OLE object, coupled with the ".objupdate" directive forcing OLE activation, points towards an exploit attempt. The critical finding of PE headers within hex data confirms the presence of an executable payload.

Heuristics 5

  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000545.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x545 44850 bytes
SHA-256: a8914b06d347a839ac50501df3cfa69849d220c47a0386cbaf12d72e406b10cd