RTF malware analysis — malicious · e21396bf5f993631

MALICIOUS

RTF

7.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-29

MD5: 8d7c43913eba26f96cd656966c1e26d5 SHA-1: b8d6ec69b83954467c392b8fccdc60d4a459c718 SHA-256: e21396bf5f9936310b4f53273db330a9620d78c1c744277b0e9126f0afdbc29d

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of Microsoft Equation Editor, specifically leveraging OLE object data and an objupdate directive to force activation. This suggests the file is designed to execute code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The embedded OLE objects and objdata sections are evidence of the exploit mechanism.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000d0d.bin` `1f3ade3675d4b43e06a41f4e1e475be599c25eda783d79a1a5b590c338ab81f5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0D	1811 bytes
`objdata_01_off00000d4c.bin` `5a99afd61f0fa864adab9da707388649e110d37d6e0c51cba0161730f1c79f07`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xD4C	36 bytes

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