Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e2120b7914147042…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2021-02-22 17:37:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 7b8b1b151615d46d1045f7e620ef4c1a SHA-1: dd74e39c571aa80b6a537949b4bf0b3650576d77 SHA-256: e2120b7914147042e5b31ffe832c4a82cf91a299a7f4cb3182d95ff2cc7daceb
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URIs point towards an attempt to lead users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/strik?utm_term=can%2527t+connect+monitor+to+laptop+hdmi PDF link annotation
    • http://gonzo-3d.com/lovisegapovebotesuv9ef1k.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zokefipevi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134311683/3bbbceab716d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/suzeboxiwo/gnE0qij/transport_tycoon_ios_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/futevanu/cMTgidr/mukewamalarunerigon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/teganipuputu/gehiihX/cataclysm_dark_days_ahead_wikipedia.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/savadapo/ghj18by/86508516493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lifeit.pro/que_significa_la_aparicion_de_moretones_en_el_cuerpouctb9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zoosalon.org/xaloluvomixinaduxadexaxogwexdk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vipujitebiki/fAEifoa/keserinig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/goronikel/8FyojiF/jebasesopepola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aduo5.online/jay_z_vol_3m35vx.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mewejubakokexal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681976/wezokiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://persequen.com/latabaselasofunekushmib3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xowebanum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453595/tobej_vulolaxus_kezobasovaza_lufoluxug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://suzurexitumafod.epizy.com/zetiraguxot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dunudorawexuva.rf.gd/793108471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://votofeki.epizy.com/canvas_draw_line_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f27f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF27F 5076 bytes
SHA-256: f6bab5d7dadc024c558d498e0b6c5d67cc363c21e5ddd2009e5b332d79b64f42
font_01_sfnt_off00010395.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10395 11068 bytes
SHA-256: ba7f890c0e81527f80834ab2712c171cdb894c3abb4e29bef2f032735eb180d2

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