MALICIOUS
360
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1055 Process Injection
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics related to process injection (WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) and dynamic library loading (LoadLibrary, GetProcAddress), strongly suggesting it attempts to inject code into another process. References to WinExec and CreateProcess indicate the execution of external commands or payloads. The OLE slack anomaly suggests potential obfuscation or padding within the document structure. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, limiting the ability to determine the exact delivery mechanism or payload.
Heuristics 9
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Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORYReference to WriteProcessMemory API
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Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREADReference to CreateRemoteThread API
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Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXECReference to WinExec API
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Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESSReference to CreateProcess API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 130,562 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 109,411 bytes (84%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECTReference to VirtualProtect API
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