Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1fdc010eab50a35…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.6 KB Created: 2020-11-09 08:54:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-03-01
MD5: cc20265c632d478bbdb00b21b8277eee SHA-1: bada4a15782c18be1caa79425be4592e1ba43eb9 SHA-256: e1fdc010eab50a358c302200be8f67382be579f2bcfa4ab49fcab4d931c59019
202 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=feh+apk+download In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371799/normal_5f8917b7d54a6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365601/normal_5f87025b3fc91.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416304/normal_5fa8c892c3c3e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367964/normal_5f8762e55dc3f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378164/normal_5f919668b1748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vexeliku/varesudavolalibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nosepevozux/zirowolifawutavu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vitelitubovuluj/cabasa_instrument_origin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zufaxepixiguxax/28000_btu_air_conditioner_dallas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/woberiz/51801323957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ninasivol/lazilemafilodukaxomaduwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suzitivasekoga/kisizasesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dasezigaro.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/12582001536.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fadedilujof.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/example_of_transaction_processing_system_in_supermarket.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/regovadeje/77809739182.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/memul/14140814141.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tofizo/burgundy_brown_hair_colors.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006356.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6356 4544 bytes
SHA-256: aa49c70b1f87eddb9e160d7eff1f3e2ee4744ee95ffb0ec8d15b67d786bad62f
font_01_sfnt_off000072c9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72C9 10832 bytes
SHA-256: 12a9f2b87d02dc7ba73e370c58910994016c15835cd9d1b76506a51fe3639d79
font_02_sfnt_off000097ac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x97AC 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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