Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · e1f97c157f054b7f

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

241.6 KB Created: 2022-08-17 09:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-18

MD5: 82e2265561f06d798c373ce7a149b347 SHA-1: 1cf1de9b70e1ed06113f9ae0e86084477b18c0c7 SHA-256: e1f97c157f054b7fad11e7f06737a835dcb894da72c777b22342cd7622d1ff8e

84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary malicious payload upon opening or interaction with the document.

Heuristics 4

Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE

OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT

Document contains an embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`ooxml_oleobject_00.bin` `91096733c7645c39d8d9acdb1a1f0fb38168973b9d16bcba2153eac5e2bfe815`	ooxml-ole-object	OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin	192000 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin` `41e2000fdcbaeb3bd54fb24c97a53f51f15419d7f97babaa205290b3f55978dc`	ole-package	OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native	187732 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`emf_00.emf` `c39ba86f5fea40b8efd206337a2ed3ebb6693755546cc2e59424c952250c39f8`	ooxml-emf	OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf	5464 bytes

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